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Abstract 
 
Recent research has identified important policy differences between voter initiative states and 
pure representative states despite a lack of enough observable voter initiative campaigns to 
explain the policy differences.  This paper investigates the indirect effects of the voter initiative 
process on legislative production by estimating the number of bills enacted in the American 
states.  The results indicate that legislators in voter initiative states enact more legislation as the 
difficulty in qualifying a voter initiative for the ballot decreases, as the legislature is less able to 
alter the effects of successful voter initiatives, and as the average number of voter initiatives that 
appear on the ballot increases.  These results provide some statistical evidence of the indirect 
effect of the voter initiative and are consistent with the theory that policy differences in voter 
initiative states are the result of the indirect effect of the voter initiative process. 
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1. Introduction 
A number of recent studies indicate that the voter initiative process has a significant impact on 
policy outcomes (Matsusaka 1995, forthcoming; Gerber 1999).  The impact of the voter 
initiative process on state fiscal policy is one of the most intriguing findings of the literature.  
Matsusaka (1995, 2004) finds that voter initiative states have a lower level of state spending, rely 
less on taxes and more on user fees, and employ a greater degree of local government spending 
relative to states in which the voter initiative process is unavailable from 1960 - 1990.  
Additionally, Matsusaka (2000) shows that voter initiative states in the first half of the century 
relied more on local expenditures than state level expenditures than pure representative states.   
However, it is interesting to note that these important fiscal policy differences between voter 
initiative and non-initiative states persist despite the lack of enough observable ballot measures 
to drive the observed policies. 
 The absence of observable successful ballot measures that directly impact state policy 
suggests the presence of an indirect effect of the voter initiative process.  Gerber (1998) notes 
that interest groups may be able to influence policy outcomes at a lower cost by pressuring the 
legislature to enact policy changes with the threat of a voter initiative.  Additionally, interest 
groups that lack the resources to succeed with a voter initiative campaign may be able to signal 
their preferences to the legislature through the voter initiative process.  The threat of a voter 
initiative can influence the state legislature to enact legislation in order to avoid the passage of a 
voter initiative.  Additionally, a potential voter initiative issue may persuade legislators to enact 
legislation when they perceive that the issue is supported by their constituents.  The indirect 
effects of the voter initiative process are examined in greater detail in Gerber (1996, 1998), 
Matsusaka and McCarty (2001), Boehmke (2005), and Matsusaka (2007). 
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However, there are other possible indirect effects of the voter initiative process as well.  
Matsusaka and McCarthy (2001) note that the voter initiative process may allow the legislature 
to leave some issues to the voters to decide directly when enough uncertainty regarding voter 
preferences is present.  Furthermore, the voter initiative process may allow legislators to avoid 
taking decisive action on controversial decisions (Magleby 1984; Cronin 1989).  In these cases, 
the passage of a voter initiative could act as a substitute for activity in the state legislature.  
Recently, controversial issues such as same-sex marriage and eminent domain have appeared 
frequently on ballots as voter initiatives. 
 While previous research has examined fiscal policy outcomes in voter initiative states 
relative to pure representative democracy states and provided a theory by which the indirect 
effect of the voter initiative process can influence policy outcomes, the literature has yet to 
provide statistical evidence regarding the influence of the voter initiative process on legislative 
behavior.  In theory, the availability of the voter initiative process can result in an increased level 
of activity on the part of the state legislature.  The legislature may enact legislation in order to 
avoid a potentially unfavorable voter initiative outcome or simply to please their constituents.  It 
is expected that legislators in voter initiative states produce more legislation in order to deal with 
the additional pressures of the voter initiative process.  Alternatively, the availability of the voter 
initiative process also allows the state legislature to defer to the voters when voter preferences 
are sufficiently uncertain or issues are extremely controversial. 
This paper examines the number of bills enacted in the American states in order to 
examine the overall effect of the voter initiative process on the production of legislation by the 
state legislature.  The results suggest that state legislatures in voter initiative states enact more 
legislation as the difficulty to qualify a voter initiative for the ballot decreases and as the 
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insulation to the legislature from the passage of a voter initiative decreases.  Additionally, 
legislatures appear to enact more legislation in states where voter initiatives are more likely to 
appear on the ballot.  These findings provide some statistical evidence of the presence of the 
indirect effect of the voter initiative process as legislators in voter initiative states are more 
active than their counterparts.  Additionally, the results are consistent with the scenario in which 
the observed policy differences between voter initiative states and non-initiative states are the 
result of legislation enacted due to the threat or signal of the voter initiative process.   
 
2. The Indirect Effect of the Voter Initiative 
The voter initiative is a ballot measure that may be used to enact a new law or constitutional 
amendment.  A voter initiative can qualify for the ballot when a specified number of signatures 
are collected to show support for a policy change.  Signature requirements vary by state and 
generally refer to a percentage of the number of votes cast in the previous state gubernatorial 
election.  The voter initiative process is available in twenty four states, which are listed along 
with the corresponding signature requirements in Table 1 (Initiative and Referendum Institute 
2009).1   
Gerber (1998), Gerber and Hug (2001) and Matsusaka (2007) provide thorough 
discussions of both the direct and indirect effects of the voter initiative process.  The direct 
effects of the voter initiative occur when the voters approve of a voter initiative that has been 
placed on the ballot.  When this is the case, voters are able to immediately and directly affect 
policy outcomes.  Although the direct effects of the voter initiative seem relatively easy to 
observe, some policies enacted through successful voter initiative campaigns may have been 
enacted by the state legislature in the absence of the voter initiative process.  Additionally, the 
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state legislature may be able to diminish the impact of a successful voter initiative campaign.  
However, the indirect effects of the availability of the voter initiative process are less 
straightforward and require some additional discussion in order to identify how they may affect 
policy outcomes.   
Gerber (1998) and Boehmke (2005) discuss the behavior of interest groups in voter 
initiative states and how these behaviors can indirectly lead to policy changes.  Gerber (1998) 
notes that interest groups may use the voter initiative process as a means to threaten the state 
legislature into making a policy change.  An interest group may be able to obtain a policy change 
at a lower cost if they are able to influence the legislature to alter a policy relative to the 
expenses involved in a successful ballot measure.  Additionally, interest groups may use the 
voter initiative process to signal the preferences of the group.  State legislatures may disagree 
with the policy preferences or be unaware of the preferences of constituents.  However, if the 
interest group can signal significant support, the legislature may find it in their interest to enact a 
policy that is supported by constituents.  Due to the availability of the voter initiative process as 
a means to pursue policy goals, Boehmke (2005) finds that voter initiative states have 
significantly more interest groups than non-initiative states.  Additionally, he shows that the 
interest groups in voter initiative states tend to be less wealthy groups with larger membership 
than interest groups in non-initiative states.  Rather than using traditional lobbying approaches, 
these broad based groups in voter initiative states tend to employ strategies that involve their 
large membership in order to influence the legislature. 
Gerber (1996) and Matsusaka and McCarthy (2001) discuss the details of the decision 
making process of the legislature when faced with the possibility of a voter initiative.  
Legislatures in states in which the voter initiative process is available must consider potential 
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voter initiative campaigns that interest groups may use in an attempt to achieve their policy 
goals.  Additionally, any legislation that is enacted by the legislature could be challenged with a 
voter initiative.  If these voter initiatives are successful, they could lead to the adoption of 
policies that contrast with the preferences of the legislature.  Additionally, the legislature may 
simply become aware of the preferences of their constituents through the voter initiative process.  
Therefore, legislators may preemptively enact legislation due to the threat or signal of a potential 
voter initiative campaign.   
Gerber (1996) models the behavior of the legislature in a sequential game in which there 
are three players: the legislature, an interest group that proposes a voter initiative, and the voter.  
The objective of each of the players is to select the policy that results in the highest utility level.  
The model provides the framework in which the legislature makes decisions when the voter 
initiative is available.  In the end, the legislature will enact legislation if it provides a greater 
benefit (or less of a loss in utility) than the possible voter initiative.  In order for the legislature to 
react to a potential voter initiative, an interest group must convince the legislature that a voter 
initiative campaign is a credible threat by displaying a certain level of support for a proposal.  
 When information is complete, the legislature will only enact policies that benefit the 
median voter due to the threat of a voter initiative campaign (Matsusaka and McCarthy 2001).  
Voter initiatives never reach the ballot in these situations as the legislature will always 
preemptively enact a policy once an interest group provides a credible threat.   However, policies 
that harm the median voter can be enacted when information is not complete as fringe interest 
groups may be able to influence the legislature.  
While the indirect effect of the voter initiative process as discussed above seems to lead 
to an increase in the level of legislative activity, successful voter initiative campaigns may 
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replace legislation in some cases.  When the state legislature is uncertain regarding voter 
preferences on a particular issue, the legislature may choose to allow voters to decide a policy 
outcome through the voter initiative process (Matsusaka and McCarthy 2001). Furthermore, 
Magleby (1984) and Cronin (1989) note that the voter initiative may allow the legislature to 
avoid making difficult decisions.  The legislature may choose inaction as opposed to making an 
unpopular decision that could hamper their reelection chances.  While legislators in pure 
representative states must enact legislation for all policy changes, legislators in voter initiative 
states may allow the voters to decide the outcome of these decisions through a voter initiative.  
This type of legislative inaction could lead to a reduction in the number of policy decisions made 
by the legislature in voter initiative states. 
 While a number of recent empirical investigations have indicated that the presence of the 
voter initiative has significant policy effects, there is little evidence that specifically attributes 
these effects to the indirect effect of the voter initiative process.  Matsusaka (1995, 2004) finds 
that states in which the voter initiative process is available have lower levels of spending and 
taxes, more user fees, and more local spending in comparison to states that lack the voter 
initiative process.  Many of these policy effects occurred without the direct proposal of a voter 
initiative.  Gerber (1998) provides some anecdotal evidence of the indirect effect of the voter 
initiative process by examining some specific examples in which interest groups appeared to 
influence the policy decisions of state legislatures through the threat of a voter initiative 
campaign.  Additionally, Matsusaka (2007) evaluates the direct and indirect effects of the voter 
initiative process on several specific outcomes by employing dummy variables for the 
availability of the voter initiative process, whether a voter initiative appeared on the ballot, and 
whether a voter initiative that appeared on the ballot was adopted.  While the previous research 
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has chronicled differences in policy outcomes and examined some specific policy cases between 
voter initiative and non-initiative states, the indirect effect of the voter initiative process on the 
behavior of the legislature has yet to be statistically evaluated. 
 This study contributes to the literature by examining the indirect impact of the voter 
initiative process on legislative production in the American states.  In theory, the availability of 
the voter initiative process causes the legislature to produce more legislation in order to avoid 
unfavorable voter initiatives and to satisfy constituents when a potential voter initiative signals 
support for an issue to the legislature.  A difference in legislation between voter initiative and 
non-initiative states would provide some statistical evidence of the indirect effect of the voter 
initiative process.  However, the availability of the voter initiative process may decrease 
legislation if the legislature is unaware of constituent preferences or defers difficult decisions to 
the voter initiative process.  This paper statistically examines the indirect effect of the voter 
initiative process by estimating the impact of the voter initiative process on the number of bills 
enacted by state legislatures. 
 
3. Measuring Legislative Production 
In order to assess the impact of the voter initiative on the production of legislation in the 
American states, this section of the paper specifies an empirical estimation of the number of bills 
enacted by state legislatures.  Numerous studies have examined the production of legislation, 
although the vast majority of the research in the area focuses on the federal government.  Crain 
(1979) and Tollison (1988) investigate the primary determinants of legislative productivity.  
Mayhew (1991), Kelly (1993), Brady and Volden (1998), Krehbiel (1998), and Howell, et al. 
(2000) examine the impact of divided government on the production of legislation at the national 
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level.  The studies examine legislation of different levels of significance in an attempt to include 
only important legislation.  Rogers (2005) estimates legislative production in the American states 
in order to examine the issue of divided government.  
 This study examines the number of bills enacted at the state level.  Following Rogers 
(2005), this analysis includes all bills passed rather than using some measure of significant 
legislation.  Given the vast number of bills enacted in states each year, it is extremely difficult 
and subjective to identify significant state level legislation.  Additionally, it is plausible that a 
number of small bills can combine to have significant effects.  Rogers (2005) uses the number of 
bills enacted in state legislatures by chamber of origin to assess the difference between divided 
branch government and divided party government.  This study uses the number of bills enacted 
at the state level in order to evaluate the impact of the voter initiative process because data on the 
chamber of origin is unavailable for many states.   
 Following previous theoretical and empirical theory, a number of important variables are 
included to account for differences between states and state legislative processes.  The log of 
population is included as a proxy for the demand of legislation (Rogers 2005) and because the 
per capita costs of laws are lower with a greater population (Tollison 1988).  These concepts 
suggest that states with higher populations will enact more legislation.  The length of the 
legislative session varies across states and tends to impact the number of bills that are enacted in 
the session.  A variable that measures the actual number of legislative business days in a session 
is included.  Longer legislative sessions may lead to an increase in the production of legislation 
as legislators have more time to enact legislation once the start up costs of convening a session 
are overcome (Crain 1979), although a large majority may achieve high rates of output in a short 
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session (Crain 1979; Crain, Shugart, & Tollison 1988).  Rogers (2005) finds evidence that longer 
legislative sessions lead to the production of more legislation. 
There are two clauses that some states employ in an attempt to regulate legislation.  
Forty-one states have a constitutional provision requiring a single subject clause that limits each 
bill to one particular topic.  Additionally, eighteen states have a constitutional provision for an 
origination clause that requires all revenue bills to originate in the house chamber of the state 
legislature.  While many previous legislative productivity studies at the national level did not 
have to consider these issues, two dummy variables are used to control for these clauses at the 
state level following Rogers (2005).  States in which the clauses do not exist are the excluded 
group.  In theory, the revenue bill of origination clause is expected to decrease legislative 
production as the state senate is unable to initiate revenue bills.  However, the effect of the single 
subject clause is somewhat ambiguous.  While it may increase the number of bills enacted as 
larger bills must be separated into individual bills, the clause may decrease the number of bills 
enacted as logrolling opportunities among legislators are reduced (Rogers 2002). 
 A dummy variable is included to account for sessions in which the state legislature was 
divided by party affiliation.  This occurs when the house and senate of a state legislature consist 
of a majority of opposite political parties.  Divided branch government is also included by 
incorporating a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the governor is the opposite 
political party of a unified legislature.  While the theoretical expectation is that divided 
government would decrease the production of legislation, numerous studies at the national level 
failed to identify any impact of divided government on the production of legislation (Mayhew 
1991; Kelly 1993; Krehbiel 1998).  However, Rogers (2005) finds that divided legislative 
government significantly reduces legislative production while divided branch government does 
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not have a significant effect at the state level.  Additionally, Alm and Evers (1991) find that the 
item veto for state governors slightly reduces and alters the composition of state government 
spending when the parties of the governor and the legislature differ. 
 A larger majority should lead to an increase in the production of legislation as the 
majority is better able to meet the required number of votes to enact a bill.  However, 
diminishing returns are expected as the majority grows because it becomes more difficult to 
monitor majority members and assign members to their most valued use (Crain 1979; Tollison 
1988).  The logged percentage of Republican legislators in both the state house and senate are 
included to examine the impact of a larger majority on legislative production.  It is also expected 
that legislative influence increases with seniority (Tollison 1988).  Legislators may gain 
information, skills, and relationships though their experiences in the legislature (Rogers 2005).  
The percentage of new legislators that join both the house and the senate from the previous 
year’s election are included in order to assess the impact of legislative turnover on legislative 
production.  It is expected that a higher percentage of new legislators will lead to less legislative 
production.  Another dummy variable accounts for the party of the governor in the state.  Rogers 
(2005) includes a Republican governor variable in order to test if Democratic governors tend to 
enact more legislation.  Besley and Case (1995) and Leigh (2008) find that there are some 
differences in specific policies between Republican and Democratic governors.  The dummy 
variable takes a value of one if the state governor is a Republican.   
 A larger number of legislators increase the cost of reaching a legislative decision, but 
larger legislatures may be able to specialize and interest groups may be able to acquire more 
votes for a specific level of expenditure with more legislators (Crain 1979; Tollison 1988).  The 
numbers of state house and senate legislators are included to account for these possible effects.  
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Rogers (2002, 2005) finds that greater numbers of legislators lead to the production of more 
legislation in both the state house and senate.  Legislative committees are expected to increase 
the production of legislation as committees are thought to decrease the incentives to free ride 
(Crain and Tollison 1982; Rogers 2002), help legislators to gain specialized knowledge (Gilligan 
and Krehbiel 1987; Krehbiel 1998), and assist legislators in achieving personal goals (Mayhew 
1974).  Variables are included to account for the number of house standing committees, senate 
standing committees, and joint standing committees.  Similarly, legislative staff may help to 
facilitate the production of legislation through increased specialization (Tollison 1998; Rogers 
2005).  The average number of staff members available to house and senate legislators is 
included in the analysis. 
Additionally, state government ideology varies widely across states.  Nelson and 
Silberberg (1987) and Tollison (1988) note that legislators respond rationally to constituent 
ideology and ideology plays an important role in the outcome of legislation.  A measure 
developed by Berry, et al. (1998) is used to examine the role of ideology in the production of 
legislation.2  Tollison (1988) observes that there are a number of economic incentives that 
influence the composition and behavior of legislatures.  An index developed by Squire (1992) 
and expanded by King (2000) that measures legislative professionalism is used to assess the 
impact of different types of individuals in the state legislature.3   
While state fixed effects cannot be employed as their inclusion would result in perfect 
collinearity with the voter initiative variables, regional dummy variables are included to account 
for any differences across regions in the U.S.  While there are states in each region of the U.S. 
that have access to the voter initiative process, the majority of the voter initiative states are in the 
West.  Additionally, there may be other differences in legislative behavior between regions in the 
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U.S.  Variables for the North, South, and West are included while the Midwest is the excluded 
region.4  Additionally, year dummy variables are included to account for time fixed effects. 
 Several methods are employed in order to examine the effect of the voter initiative on the 
number of bills enacted.  The first specification includes a dummy variable to account for voter 
initiative states.  States in which the voter initiative process is available receive a value of one 
while states that lack the voter initiative process are the excluded group.5  However, voter 
initiative states differ in the amount of signatures that are required in order to place a voter 
initiative on the ballot.  The signature requirement generally refers to the percentage of the 
previous gubernatorial election votes that must be collected and varies from a low of three 
percent to a high of fifteen percent (Initiative and Referendum Institute 2009).  The difference in 
the signature requirement results in substantial variation in the effects of the voter initiative 
process as it can be very difficult to collect the necessary signatures in high requirement states.  
The voter initiative states and the corresponding signature requirement are displayed in Table 1. 
 Additionally, states differ in other ways regarding the qualifications necessary to 
successfully place a voter initiative on the ballot and the extent to which the legislature can 
mitigate the impact of a successful voter initiative.  In order to further evaluate the effects of the 
voter initiative process, several alternative measures of the voter initiative process are examined.  
Bowler and Donovan (2004) introduce two indices to account for differences in voter initiative 
methods between states.  The qualification difficulty index measures the complexity of 
qualifying a voter initiative proposal for the ballot.  The qualification difficulty index ranges 
from zero to six based on the necessary requirements to qualify a proposal for a ballot.  It is 
substantially easier to place a proposal on the ballot in states with higher values.  The legislative 
insulation index measures the extent to which the state legislature can mitigate the effects of a 
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successful voter initiative.  The legislative insulation index ranges from zero to nine.  
Legislatures in states with higher values have a lesser ability to block the effects of a successful 
voter initiative.6  States that lack the voter initiative process receive a value of zero in each index.  
Additionally, the average number of voter initiatives that appear on the ballot each two year 
election cycle from 1970 – 2002 is employed in order to roughly gauge the likelihood of a voter 
initiative appearing on the ballot.  While it is impossible to accurately measure the threat of a 
voter initiative campaign due to unavailable data regarding potential voter initiative campaigns, 
the average number of voter initiatives provides a measure of the frequency of voter initiative 
use (Tolbert, Grummel, and Smith 2001; Bowler and Donovan 2004).  Table 1 displays the 
values of each of the Bowler and Donovan (2004) variables and the average number of voter 
initiatives for voter initiative states.   
 The dependent variable is the number of bills enacted by the American states during the 
regular legislative session in odd years from 1981 – 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2001.  While almost 
all states hold legislative sessions annually, the dependent variable and a number of the 
independent variables are reported biennially in The Book of the States (Rogers 2005).  Data 
sources are listed in Table 2.  Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.   
 
4. Regression Results and Discussion 
The results of the analysis with dummy variables for voter initiative states, the qualification 
difficulty index, the legislative insulation index, and the average number of voter initiatives are 
presented in Table 4.  Due to the panel nature of the data, it is likely that interclass correlation 
may be an issue for legislative production observations within a state over time.  When 
unaccounted for, this correlation can cause significance tests to be invalid as standard errors may 
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be misestimated.  In order to correct for this possible problem, clustered standard errors are 
employed in all estimates with the exception of column (a).  Clustered standard errors were 
omitted in column (a) for comparison purposes. 
Column (a) of Table 4 shows that states with the voter initiative enact more bills per year 
than states that lack the voter initiative process.  Voter initiative states enact an average of 
approximately sixty-eight more bills per session than non-initiative states, significant at the ten 
percent level.  However, the voter initiative dummy variable is not significant in column (b) in 
Table 4 when clustered standard errors are employed.  While the coefficients in column (b) 
remain unchanged from column (a), standard errors are larger in the analysis with clustered 
standard errors.  However, it is important to remember the differences between voter initiative 
states.  Different signature requirements and other restrictions make the voter initiative process 
much more accessible and useful in some states than others.  The dummy variable for voter 
initiative states does not account for these differences between states, combining states with 
strong and weak voter initiative processes together. 
The specifications using the Bowler and Donovan (2004) variables accounting for 
differences between voter initiative processes, reported in columns (c) and (d) of Table 4, 
suggest that the voter initiative process leads to greater legislative productivity.  Column (c) of 
Tables 4 shows that legislatures in voter initiative states where the qualifications for placing a 
proposal on the ballot are relatively simple create significantly more legislation than voter 
initiative states with restrictive qualifications.  The coefficient for qualification difficulty is 
highly significant at the one percent level and indicates that legislation is increased by 
approximately forty bills as the index for the accessibility to the voter initiative process increases 
by one unit.  Column (d) of Table 4 displays that state legislatures are more active in voter 
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initiative states where the legislature is more restricted in their ability to mitigate the effects of 
the passage of a successful voter initiative.  The coefficient for legislative insulation is highly 
significant at the one percent level and indicates that legislation is increased by thirty-two bills as 
the index for the insulation to the state legislature from the voter initiative process increases by 
one unit.  These estimates suggest that states that have relatively easy access to the voter 
initiative process and policies that shield successful voter initiatives from the state legislature 
tend to have a greater level of legislative production relative to voter initiative states with weaker 
voter initiative processes. 
 Column (e) of Table 4 displays the regression results for the empirical specification 
including the voter initiative dummy, qualification difficulty index, and the legislative insulation 
index together.  The voter initiative dummy variable is significant at the one percent level, the 
qualification difficulty index is significant at the ten percent level, and the legislative insulation 
index is insignificant in the analysis.  The coefficient for the voter initiative dummy variable is 
approximately negative four hundred.  As the qualification difficulty index increases by one unit, 
state legislatures produce approximately ninety-four more bills per session.  Considering the 
qualification difficulty index as an interaction term with the voter initiative dummy variable, the 
qualification difficulty index must be five or greater in order for the availability of the voter 
initiative process to have a significant positive effect on the production of legislation.  This 
provides further evidence that an accessible voter initiative process is necessary to generate 
greater legislation. 
 Finally, column (f) of Table 4 reports the coefficients for the empirical estimation 
including the average number of voter initiatives that appear on the ballot each two year election 
cycle from 1970 – 2002.  As the average number of voter initiative measures on the ballot 
- 18 - 
 
increases by one, approximately eighty-three additional bills are produced, significant at the one 
percent level.  This provides some evidence that state legislatures are more active as the 
likelihood that a voter initiative will appear on the ballot increases.7   
 
4.1. Implications of the Voter Initiative Process 
These findings suggest that access to the voter initiative process and protection from the 
legislature for a successful voter initiative are important in shaping the behavior of the state 
legislature.  The additional activity by the state legislature in voter initiative states provides some 
evidence of the indirect effect of the voter initiative process as legislators in voter initiative states 
enact more legislation than their non-initiative legislative counterparts.  This finding is consistent 
with the theory that fiscal policy differences between voter initiative states and non-initiative 
states are the result of the indirect effect of the voter initiative process.  The observed policy 
differences may be attributed to the additional legislation in voter initiative states. 
 Additionally, it appears that the mere existence of the voter initiative process may not be 
enough to influence legislator behavior.  In order for the legislature to respond to the availability 
of the voter initiative process, the voter initiative process must be a serious threat.   Legislatures 
in states with easier access to the voter initiative process and less legislative ability to block 
successful voter initiative campaigns appear more active.  Furthermore, the results imply that the 
scenario in which legislation is reduced when the state legislature defers to the voter initiative 
process regarding uncertain or controversial issues are either insignificant or simply outweighed 
by the positive effects of the voter initiative process on state legislation.  While we do not 
perceive any legislative reduction for these controversial issues, legislators may still defer to the 
voter initiative in a small number of cases, rendering them insignificant in this big picture study. 
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 Despite the significant findings in this study, it is important to consider some alternative 
interpretations of the results.  It is extremely difficult to devise an empirical strategy that directly 
connects the threat of the voter initiative process with policy outcomes.  We cannot completely 
dismiss the possibility of spurious correlation in which voter initiative states simply happen to 
enact more legislation than non-initiative states for unobserved reasons.  Additionally, some 
recent research has asserted that the voter initiative process is endogenous to historical factors 
within states (Marschall and Ruhil 2005).  However, Matsusaka (2005) provides evidence 
against the endogeneity issue, noting that the vast majority of voter initiative states gained access 
to the voter initiative process prior to 1915 (Matsusaka 1995). 
 It is also possible that the additional legislation that is observed in voter initiative states 
may occur due to other effects of the voter initiative process.  While legislation may be a 
response to the threat of a voter initiative or a reaction to the realization of constituent 
preferences as considered previously, the additional legislation may also simply be the result of 
the state legislature enacting legislation due to successful voter initiative campaigns.  
Furthermore, the increased number of bills enacted may be the result of legislators’ attempts to 
mitigate the effects of successful voter initiative campaigns.  The positive and significant 
coefficient on the dependent variable for the average number of voter initiatives could be 
attributed to these possibilities.  Despite the limitations of the study, the results offer the first 
empirical evaluation of the impact of the voter initiative process on legislative production and 
are consistent with the theory behind policy differences between voter initiative and non-
initiative states.    
 
4.2. Other Variables of Interest 
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Although the primary focus of the study involves the indirect effect of the voter initiative 
process, several other independent variables are of interest as well.  The logged population 
coefficients indicate that approximately one additional bill is produced as the population 
increases by one percent, significant in the estimations at the five percent level.  This follows the 
rationale that higher populations help to proxy the demand for legislation and the per capita costs 
of legislation are lower with greater population.  The session length coefficient is positive and 
significant at the ten percent level in columns (b), (c), and (d) of Table 4, providing evidence that 
legislatures may enact more legislation when given more time to overcome the initial startup 
costs of the session.  Additionally, this provides evidence against the theory that legislators 
achieve a higher output rate in a short time frame. 
 The large, negative coefficient on the dummy variable for a single subject clause for bills 
in columns (b) and (e) of Table 4 is significant at the ten percent level and suggests that single 
subject clauses may reduce legislative output.  Additionally, the dummy variable for states that 
require revenue bills to originate in the state house is negative and significant at the ten percent 
level in column (d), providing some evidence that revenue bill clauses reduce legislation.  The 
dummy variable for a republican governor is surprisingly significant at the five percent level in 
columns (b) and (d) and significant at the ten percent level in column (c), implying that 
republican governors may preside over more productive legislatures.  However, the logged 
percentages of house and senate republicans are insignificant in all cases. 
 The state government ideology coefficient is significant at the ten percent level in 
columns (c) and (d), indicating that state legislatures may enact more legislation as their 
ideology score becomes more liberal.  Finally, the regional variables indicate that states in the 
South and West appear to enact significantly more legislation than states in other regions.  
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However, it is interesting to note that the variable for the West is insignificant when the average 
number of voter initiatives variable is included in column (f) of Table 4. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of the voter initiative process on legislative production in the 
American states.  In theory, the threat of the voter initiative can cause the state legislature to 
preemptively enact legislation in order to avoid an unfavorable outcome from the passage of a 
voter initiative or simply to satisfy constituent interests when a potential voter initiative signals a 
high level of support for an issue (Gerber 1998; Gerber and Hug 2001; Matsusaka 2007).  
Additionally, the voter initiative process can theoretically lead to a reduction in legislation if the 
state legislature defers to the voter initiative process due to uncertainty or avoidance of 
controversial issues.  The effects of the voter initiative process on legislation are particularly 
interesting given the differences in fiscal policies between voter initiative and non-initiative 
states (Matsusaka 1995, 2000, 2004). 
 The results in this paper suggest that the availability of the voter initiative causes state 
legislatures to be more active as citizens have easier access to the voter initiative process, state 
legislators are less able to block the impact of successful voter initiatives, and voter initiatives 
appear on the ballot more frequently.  These findings provide some of the first statistical 
evidence of the indirect effects of the voter initiative process as voter initiative states appear to 
enact more legislation than their counterparts.  The additional legislation is consistent with a 
scenario in which legislators in voter initiative states respond to the threat of the voter initiative 
process, resulting in the observed policy differences between voter initiative and non-initiative 
states.  However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the additional legislation could be the 
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result of state legislators enacting more legislation to deal with successful voter initiatives or 
unobserved reasons that the legislators in voter initiative states are more active. 
 These findings also provide some important implications for future research in the area. 
The degree to which the greater legislation found in voter initiative states helps align policy 
outcomes with voter preferences depends critically on the quality of information exchanged 
between agents in the voter initiative process.  The additional legislation in voter initiative states 
may help align policy outcomes with voter preferences if information is complete, but may lead 
to policies further from the median voter’s preferences with incomplete information.  
Additionally, the results in this study suggest that a more detailed analysis of the source and 
impact of the increased legislation in voter initiatives states could substantially increase our 
understanding of the indirect effects of the voter initiative process given the differences in policy 
outcomes between voter initiative and non-initiative states.   
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Notes
 
* I am grateful to two anonymous referees, editor James Alm, and Russell S. Sobel for helpful comments and 
suggestions.  I would also like to thank Angela K. Dills and participants at a session at the Southern Economic 
Association annual meetings. 
 
1
 A voter referendum is a similar process that can be used to revoke a law or constitutional amendment that has been 
enacted by the state legislature.  Additionally, state legislatures in all states can propose a policy through a 
legislative referendum (Initiative and Referendum Institute 2009).  This analysis focuses on the voter initiative 
process as it is the tool that allows interest groups to propose new policies. 
 
2
 Berry et al. (1998) construct an index of state government ideology by examining the division of the state 
legislature, the party of the governor, the outcomes of congressional elections, roll call for the state congress, and 
other assumptions about state politicians.  This analysis uses the revised 1960-2006 government ideology series.  It 
is available through the web site listed in the references.  The index ranges from 0 – 100, with higher scores 
indicating a more liberal government. 
 
3
 Squire (1992) constructs a state index of legislative professionalism based on the length of the legislative session, 
the salary of legislators, and the staff size.  King (2000) updates the index to account for other legislative 
expenditures. 
 
4
 Regional variables are constructed as follows: North (CT, MA, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT), South (AL, AR, 
DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV), Midwest (IA, ID, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, 
NE, OH, SD, WI), and West (AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY). 
 
5
 Wyoming is not included as a voter initiative state because it has an extremely high signature requirement at fifteen 
percent.  Illinois is not included as a voter initiative state because it is the only state in which a proposal can only be 
used to alter the organization of the state legislature.  This follows the logic of Matsusaka (2004).  The inclusion of 
Wyoming and Illinois does not significantly alter the results. 
 
6
 Bowler and Donovan (2004) use the number of formal provisions required to place a voter initiative on the ballot 
in order to develop the qualification difficulty index.  The number of provisions that restrict the ability of the 
legislature to alter the effects of a successful voter initiative are used to develop the legislative insulation index.   
Their indices have been reversed in this paper in order to simplify the interpretation of the indices.  Bowler and 
Donovan (2004) find that reversing the indices do not alter the results.  States that lack the voter initiative process 
receive a value of zero. 
 
7
 Several additional empirical examinations were analyzed in order to verify the robustness of the results, although 
the results are excluded due to space limitations.  These examinations include employing the log of the number of 
bills enacted as the dependent variable, investigating the number of bills enacted by decade, and performing an 
analysis consisting solely of the voter initiative states.  The primary finding that greater access to the voter initiative 
process and greater insulation from the legislature for successful voter initiative campaigns tend to result in higher 
levels of legislative production is robust to the aforementioned changes.  The robustness checks are available from 
the author upon request. 
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Table 1: The Voter Initiative States 
State (Date Initiative 
Process Adopted) 
Signature 
Requirementa 
Qualification 
Difficulty 
Indexb 
Legislative 
Insulation 
Indexb 
Average Number 
of Voter 
Initiativesc 
Alaska (1959) 10 4 2 2.00 
Arizona (1912) 10 7 4 2.93 
Arkansas (1909) 8 8 5 1.56 
California (1911) 5 9 9 9.00 
Colorado (1912) 5 7 6 5.13 
Florida (1972) 8 5 3 1.31 
Idaho (1912) 6 6 5 1.06 
Illinois (1902) 8 5 3 0.06 
Maine (1908) 10 2 3 2.00 
Massachusetts (1918) 3.5 2 4 2.56 
Michigan (1908) 8 7 5 1.94 
Mississippi (1992) 12 3 2 0.50 
Missouri (1906) 5 4 4 1.94 
Montana (1904) 5 4 4 2.75 
Nebraska (1912) 7 4 3 1.06 
Nevada (1904) 10 5 3 1.62 
North Dakota (1914) 2 7 6 2.44 
Ohio (1912) 6 4 5 1.81 
Oklahoma (1907) 8 6 4 1.13 
Oregon (1902) 6 7 7 8.19 
South Dakota (1898) 5 6 5 2.13 
Utah (1900) 10 6 4 0.94 
Washington (1912) 8 6 4 4.63 
Wyoming (1968) 15 1 1 0.38 
a. The signature requirement for statutes was included for all states with the exception of Florida and Mississippi.  The signature 
requirement for constitutional amendments was used for Florida and Mississippi because they only allow constitutional 
amendments. 
 
b. The indices are developed in Bowler and Donovan (2004).  The qualification difficulty index ranges from 1 to 6 with the 
difficulty in qualifying a voter initiative for the ballot decreasing as the values increase.  The legislative insulation index ranges 
from 1 to 9 with the insulation to the legislature decreasing as the values increase.  States that lack the voter initiative process 
receive a value of 0. 
 
c. The average number of voter initiatives is calculated as the average number of voter initiatives that appear on the ballot each 
two year election cycle from 1970 – 2002.  Mississippi gained access to the voter initiative process in 1992.  The average for 
Mississippi refers to years 1994 – 2002. 
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Table 2: Data Sources and Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
Number of Bills Enacted Number of bills enacted in state regular legislative session a 
Number of Special Sessions Number of special sessions called in states a 
Number of Gubernatorial 
Vetoes 
Number of gubernatorial vetoes state regular legislative 
session 
a 
Initiative = 1 for states in which the voter initiative is available b 
Signature Requirement = percentage signature requirement for initiative states b 
Population (log) Log of the population (in 1000’s) c 
Session Length Number of legislative work days in the regular session a 
Bill Single Subject Clause = 1 for states that restrict bills to a single subject d 
Revenue Bill Origination 
Clause 
= 1 for states in which revenue bills must originate in the 
house chamber 
d 
Divided Legislature = 1 for states in which legislative chambers have opposing 
majority parties 
a 
Opposite Party Governor = 1 for states in which a unified legislature face an opposite 
party governor 
a 
Republican Governor = 1 for states with a republican governor a 
House Republicans (% log) Log of the percentage of republicans in lower chamber a 
Senate Republicans (% log) Log of the percentage of republicans in upper chamber a 
House Turnover (%) Percentage newly elected legislator from previous years lower 
chamber election 
a 
Senate Turnover (%) Percentage newly elected legislator from previous years upper 
chamber election 
a 
House Standing Committees Number of standing committees in the lower chamber a 
Senate Standing Committees Number of standing committees in the upper chamber a 
Joint Standing Committees Number of joint standing committees  a 
Number of House Legislators Number of legislators in the lower chamber a 
Number of Senate Legislators Number of legislators in the upper chamber a 
House Staff Average staff allocated to lower chamber legislators a 
Senate Staff Average staff allocated to upper chamber legislators a 
Legislative Professionalism Index by Squire (1992) and King (2000) on a scale of 0 to 1 f 
Legislative Scope Limits = 1 for states that limit the scope of legislative regular 
sessions 
d 
State Government Ideology = 0 – 100; higher scores indicating a more liberal government. g 
Qualification Difficulty Index Measures difficulty of qualifying a proposition for the ballot; 
ranges from 0 – 6; easier to qualify for higher values. 
e 
Legislative Insulation Index Measures the ability of the legislature to alter successful voter 
initiatives; ranges from 0 – 9; less ability for the state 
legislature to alter outcomes for higher values. 
e 
Average # of Voter Initiatives Average number of voter initiatives appearing on the ballot 
over each two year election cycle from 1970 - 2000 
b 
Sources: 
 a: The Book of the States     e: Bowler and Donovan (2004) 
 b: Initiative and Referendum Institute   f: Squire (1992) and King (2000) 
 c: Statistical Abstract of the U.S., U.S. Census Bureau g: Berry et al. (1998) 
 d: National Conference of State Legislators 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Average Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum 
Value 
Minimum 
Value 
Number of Bills Enacted (per year) 484.42 352.76 3,068 34 
State Population (in thousands) 5,101 5,513 34,533 416 
Session Length 79.71 58.18 731 372 
House Standing Committees 19.23 10.08 59 0 
Senate Standing Committees 14.83 6.56 38 0 
Joint Standing Committees 2.77 5.85 24 0 
House Legislators 111.30 55.20 40 400 
Senate Legislators 39.79 10.55 20 67 
House Staff 1.07 0.75 3 0 
Senate Staff 1.17 0.68 3 0 
Legislative Professionalism 0.27 0.15 0.90 0.04 
State Government Ideology 49.45 24.17 97.92 0.00 
Average # Voter Initiatives 1.16 1.97 9 0 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of bills enacted by the American states during the regular legislative session in odd 
years from 1981 – 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2001.  While almost all states hold legislative sessions annually, the dependent variable 
and a number of the independent variables are reported biennially in The Book of the States (Rogers, 2005).   
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Table 4: Number of Bills Enacted 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient Estimates (standard errors are in parenthesis) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Voter Initiative 67.77* 
(35.75) 
67.77 
(69.91) 
- - - - - - -401.49*** 
(129.65) 
- - - 
Qualification 
Difficulty Index 
- - - - - - 39.83*** 
(14.64) 
- - - 94.32* 
(57.18) 
- - - 
Legislative 
Insulation Index 
- - - - - - - - - 32.00*** 
(12.32) 
19.99 
(42.31) 
- - - 
Average # of 
Voter Initiatives 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 83.03*** 
(21.81) 
Population (log) 137.56*** 
(26.96) 
137.56** 
(54.22) 
126.58** 
(52.71) 
126.46** 
(53.92) 
100.32** 
(49.11) 
98.08** 
(47.66) 
Session Length 0.79 *** 
(0.30) 
0.79* 
(0.46) 
0.71* 
(0.42) 
0.81* 
(0.45) 
0.71 
(0.49) 
0.57 
(0.39) 
Bill Single 
Subject Clause 
-239.48*** 
(63.07) 
-239.49* 
(136.51) 
-192.76  
(118.52) 
-186.07  
(114.97) 
-201.46*  
(117.13) 
-150.89  
(113.59) 
Revenue Bill 
Origination  
-57.46  
(36.35) 
-57.46  
(74.39) 
-69.70  
(74.99) 
-52.04* 
(77.77) 
-91.11 
(79.14) 
-111.29 
(75.65) 
Divided 
Legislature 
-48.07 
(43.03) 
-48.07 
(59.89) 
-45.74 
(58.06) 
-49.35 
(56.96) 
-45.25 
(57.77) 
-35.39 
(52.01) 
Opposite Party 
Governor 
-6.57 
(35.25) 
-6.57 
(33.11) 
-2.59 
(31.58) 
-3.86 
(30.92) 
0.45 
(29.52) 
2.51 
(29.84) 
Republican 
Governor 
102.02** 
(41.09) 
102.02** 
(51.35) 
94.77* 
(48.84) 
102.75** 
(49.24) 
65.91 
(46.13) 
54.45 
(43.84) 
House Republican 
(% log) 
28.70 
(57.24) 
28.70 
(89.05) 
-5.15 
(82.06) 
-4.96 
(76.62) 
-83.25 
(69.62) 
-59.18 
(70.25) 
Senate Republican 
(% log) 
-41.94  
(52.69) 
-41.94  
(62.87) 
-34.58 
(61.75) 
-35.84 
(60.49) 
16.72 
(60.49) 
-10.73 
(59.28) 
House Turnover 
(%) 
-1.66 
(1.91) 
-1.66 
(1.74) 
-1.81 
(1.73) 
-2.07 
(1.70) 
-1.37 
(1.75) 
-2.14 
(1.73) 
Senate Turnover 
(%) 
-1.37 
(1.73) 
-1.37 
(1.15) 
-0.99 
(1.08) 
-0.96 
(1.07) 
-1.42 
(0.97) 
-0.47 
(1.02) 
House Standing 
Committees 
-7.15*** 
(2.73) 
-7.15 
(5.78) 
-6.19  
(6.00) 
-6.54  
(5.99) 
-4.23  
(5.31) 
-2.94  
(5.56) 
Senate Standing 
Committees 
-0.47 
(3.92) 
-0.47 
(8.29) 
0.15 
(8.45) 
0.83 
(8.58) 
0.52 
(8.41) 
-4.32 
(7.61) 
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Table 4: Number of Bills Enacted (Continued) 
Joint Standing 
Committees 
-4.74  
(3.80) 
-4.74  
(5.83) 
-4.33 
(5.99)  
-3.11 
(5.99)  
0.39 
(6.07)  
-5.83 
(5.58)  
Number of  House 
Legislators 
0.47 
(0.37) 
0.47 
(0.53) 
0.52 
(0.51) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.45 
(0.43) 
0.29 
(0.43) 
Number of Senate 
Legislators 
3.11* 
(1.80) 
3.11  
(3.65) 
3.30  
(3.56) 
3.02 
(3.51) 
2.91 
(3.34) 
4.21 
(3.45) 
House Staff 12.15  
(32.75) 
12.15  
(33.27) 
8.35 
(31.93) 
12.66 
(32.17) 
6.15 
(33.37) 
14.82 
(30.96) 
Senate Staff -33.64 
(34.08) 
-33.64 
(36.55) 
-20.34 
(34.20) 
-22.01 
(34.53) 
-34.88 
(34.97) 
-7.67 
(35.12) 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
-43.18  
(172.30) 
-43.18  
(516.41) 
-138.24 
(470.62) 
-216.80 
(458.84) 
-93.29 
(413.27) 
-383.59 
(343.93) 
Ideology 2.20** 
(0.96) 
2.20  
(1.37) 
2.29* 
(1.31) 
2.66* 
(1.40) 
1.57 
(1.32) 
0.98 
(1.14) 
North -23.47  
(76.02) 
-23.47  
(153.16) 
70.39  
(143.75) 
62.32  
(145.08) 
114.22  
(123.29) 
129.47  
(136.05) 
South 201.88*** 
(53.35) 
201.88** 
(90.11) 
249.38*** 
(96.21) 
227.23** 
(98.02) 
307.79*** 
(87.17) 
243.01*** 
(89.93) 
West 230.75*** 
(49.49) 
230.75** 
(111.20) 
226.46** 
(104.69) 
205.75** 
(103.93) 
254.84*** 
(93.51) 
82.19 
(87.88) 
Constant -1623.76 
(370.81) 
-1623.76 
(759.31) 
-1497.92 
(735.69) 
-1501.50 
(752.15) 
-979.66 
(667.50) 
-835.93 
(657.44) 
R-Squared 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.41 
Note:  The dependent variable is the number of bills enacted in the American states during the regular legislative session every 
other year from 1981 – 1995, 1998, 2000, & 2001.  While almost all states hold legislative sessions annually, the dependent 
variable and a number of the independent variables are reported biennially in The Book of the States (Rogers, 2005).  Standard 
errors are noted in parenthesis.  There are 461 observations.  Asterisks indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 
10%.  Year dummy variables are not reported. Clustered standard errors are employed at the state level in (b) through (f). 
 
 
